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Among the most important recent advances in thinking on international development is the idea 
that population health has a significant effect on economic performance. Although the effects of 
individuals' health status on their productivity and earnings are readily observable and widely 
acknowledged, the consequences of population health for economic performance (at the macro 
level) and for the well-being of individuals, families, and firms are more difficult to discern and 
have been, until recently, rather neglected.  
 
This chapter goes beyond the traditional economic thinking about the relationship between health 
and income – simply stated: wealth is needed to achieve health – by presenting evidence that 
population health is an important factor in strengthening economies and reducing poverty. The 
world's overarching framework for reducing poverty is expressed in the UN's eight Millennium 
Development Goals. Three of these eight goals pertain to health: reducing child mortality, 
improving maternal health, and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. These 
potentially huge improvements in health are extremely important goals in themselves, and they 
serve as beacons toward which numerous development efforts are oriented. But these potential 
improvements in health are not only endpoints that we seek through a variety of means. The 
improvements are actually instruments for achieving economic growth and poverty reduction. 
That is, better health does not have to wait for an improved economy; measures to reduce the 
burden of disease, to give children healthy childhoods, to increase life expectancy will in 
themselves contribute to creating healthier economies.  
 
This insight is relatively new and has significant political implications: Finance ministers whose 
concerns have been tightly tied to national budgets and staving off crises have a new tool to work 
with, since devoting resources to health improvements can be a powerful means of abetting 
economic growth and mitigating poverty. 
 
This chapter first looks at some straightforward data about the links between health and income 
and notes the traditional thinking that explains this connection. It then describes how views are 
changing and in particular focuses on new evidence that good health can promote economic 
growth and well-being. After focusing on the specific connections between health and poverty, 
the chapter explores the mechanisms by which improved health can lead to better economic 
outcomes. The final sections discuss HIV/AIDS as a window onto the issues addressed 
throughout the chapter and the policy directions that flow from the research and views presented 
here. 
 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to Larry Rosenberg, and to Helen Curry, Guenther Fink, and Jocelyn Finlay, for their 
assistance in the preparation of this chapter.  
Some basic facts and the traditional view of their implications 
 
Table 2.1, which groups countries by their infant mortality rate (IMR – the number of infants 
who die before reaching 1 year of age per 1000 live births) and income level in 1960, illustrates 
the general pattern connecting health and economic well-being. It shows that, within a given 
income classification, countries with higher infant mortality rates in 1960 generally experienced 
lower rates of economic growth between 1960 and 2000 (though de la Croix and Licandro 
(1999) offer a cautionary note on a related point, finding that "the effect of life expectancy on 
growth is positive for economies with a relatively low life expectancy, but could be negative in 
more advanced economies [where life expectancy is higher on average]"). For example, on 
average countries that had a GDP per capita between $3,500 and $7,000 in 1960, and IMR less 
than 50 per 1000, experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.5 percent over the subsequent 
40 years. By contrast, a country with a GDP per capita less than $1,000 in 1960 and IMR greater 
than 150 per 1000 experienced an average of 0.8 percent per capita GDP growth over the 
subsequent 40 years. 
 
Table 2.1 Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita Income, 1960–2000 
(by income per capita and infant mortality rate, 1960) 
 
Initial Infant Mortality 
Rate, 1960 
IMR < 50  50 < IMR < 100  100 < IMR < 150  IMR > 150 
Initial Income, 1960  
(Constant 2000 US$, PPP) 
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Sources: 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2006) for income and growth rate data. 
World Bank (2006) for IMR data. 
Notes:  
PPP means Purchasing Power Parity 
The reported growth rate is the simple average of the GDP growth rates of all countries in the specific 
cell. 
The number of observations in each cell is displayed in parentheses below the average growth rate. 
 
  2Indeed, the positive correlation between income per capita and good health (the latter often 
assessed by life expectancy; see Figure 2.1) is one of the best-established facts in the field of 
international development. However, determining causality in the relationship between high 
incomes and good health remains a vexing issue. Good health could lead to high incomes, the 
reverse could be true, both could be true, or some other variables could be driving both health 
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Source: World Bank (2006), World Development Indicators 2006. Data are for 2004. 
Note: The circled outliers, from lower to higher income, are Botswana and South Africa.   
 
To explain the apparent health-wealth relationship, traditional economic thinking (for example, 
World Bank 1993a) has asserted that income growth is a key factor underpinning improved 
population health. The title of a journal article, Wealthier is Healthier (Pritchett and Summers 
1996), succinctly captures this view.  The assertion has a strong theoretical and intuitive basis. 
Higher incomes lead to greater command over many of the goods and services that promote 
health, such as better nutrition, safe water, and access to quality health services. Higher incomes 
also promote technical progress and dissemination of new health technologies, which have been 
the major force behind health improvements (Easterlin 1999; Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 
2006). Consistent with this perspective, policies prescribed by international financial institutions 
  3for developing countries have focused on growth in gross domestic product (GDP) to the neglect 
and even the detriment of population health (Navarro 2004: 1322).   
 
 
Evolving views of health, wealth, and development  
 
An early and influential analysis suggesting that rising income is not the only driver of health 
improvements comes from Samuel Preston (1975), who plotted the relationship between life 
expectancy and national income per capita during the 1900s, 1930s, and 1960s (Figure 2.2). 
Preston’s curves reveal two important insights. First, a rise in per capita GDP is associated with 
greater gains in life expectancy in poorer countries than in wealthy ones. Second, the curve shifts 
up over time. For a given level of income per capita, life expectancy rose substantially over the 
study period. For example, an individual from a country with GDP per capita of $500 could 
expect to live around 59 years in the 1930s and 68 years in the 1960s. Preston calculated that if 
income was the sole determinant of mortality, then gains in life expectancy would have been 
small (2.5 years between 1938 and 1963). Yet, when he accounted for the upward shift of the 
curve during the same period, significantly larger health gains were predicted (12.2 years). 
Preston concludes that factors exogenous to a country’s level of income accounted for 75–90 per 
cent of the rise in life expectancy, worldwide, over this period. These exogenous factors include 
medical and scientific breakthroughs – such as the development of vaccines and antibiotics – as 
well as advancements in sanitation and hygiene. Income growth per se accounted for only 10–25 
per cent of the gain in life expectancy.  
 
  4Figure 2.2 
Relationship between Life Expectancy at Birth and National Income per Capita, for 
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1930s trend line 
 
1960s trend line 
Source: Preston (1975). 
 
Preston summarizes his findings: “There is no reason to expect a direct influence of national 
income per head on mortality… its influence is indirect; a higher income implies and facilitates, 
though it does not necessarily entail, larger real consumption of items affecting health such as 
food, housing, medical and public health services, education, leisure and health-related research, 
and, on the negative side, automobiles, cigarettes, animal fats and physical inertia.” (Preston 
1975: 232). 
 
Similarly, WHO, analyzing data from 1952–1992, found that income growth is less important to 
improving health outcomes than are other factors. In the period studied, average per capita 
income increased from $1530 to $2560 (in 1985 international dollars). If the relationship 
  5between income and infant mortality rate (IMR) had remained as it was in 1952, IMR would 
have dropped from 144 per thousand to 116 per thousand by 1992. In reality, however, it 
dropped much more sharply to 55 per thousand. This discrepancy is attributed to factors 
“exogenous to wealth,” namely technological progress and knowledge diffusion (WHO 1999: 5). 
 
Preston's investigations drew the attention of economists and others to the links between income 
pecific inter-country comparisons of health outcomes and GDP levels, such as those given in 
Table 2.2  
Cross-Country Comparison o ctancy and GDP Per Capita 
Country  Life expectancy (2004)  GDP per capita (2004 PPP) 
and population health. Bloom and Canning (forthcoming 2007) provide a contemporary take on 
Preston's seminal work and its continuing importance. They note the importance of technological 
progress (i.e., not just income growth) in spurring health gains and point out why income per 
capita is an imperfect proxy of well-being. They also delve into the causality questions raised by 
the simultaneous improvement of health and income. 
 
S
Table 2.2, also weaken the case for a strict wealth-to-health causal linkage. Despite having an 
average per capita income that is four times higher than Costa Rica's, the United States has a 
lower life expectancy. Similarly, South Africa has double the per capita income of Cuba, but life 




United States  77.4  36,465 
Costa Rica  78.7  8,714 
South Africa  44.6  10,286 
Cuba 77.0  5,259 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 006. Data for GDP per capita for Cuba are from 
xtaposing Cuba and the United States further illustrates this point. The two countries have 
igher incomes can lead to improvements in population health, but sometimes they do not. 
 2
UNDP (2003), Human Development Report.  
Note: PPP = Purchasing Power Parity 
 
Ju
similar life expectancies and equivalent IMRs (7 per 1000). Yet these countries differ 
significantly in terms of income per capita. The World Development Report 2003 characterized 
Cuba as a “puzzle” of “good health without growth.” Cuba’s impressive health outcomes are 
thought to be attributable to the priority assigned by the government to health care, as evidenced 
by the establishment of well-staffed community clinics, immunization campaigns, vector control, 
and a commitment to minimizing inequality in access to health care. 
 
H
Presumably, the distribution of income among members of society, a country’s economic and 
social policies, and the strength of its institutions are also important. 
 
  6In recent years, economists have focused increasingly on the links between population health and 
ow have these improvements in population health affected economies? Fogel (1990) states, 
conometric studies that build on data from a large set of countries provide strong evidence that 
state income by about 4 per cent.  
economic growth. Such research has been spurred by recognition of the global transformation in 
human health of the last 150 years, during which people have lived longer, and led healthier, 
more productive lives. Between the sixteenth and the mid-nineteenth century, life expectancy 
around the world fluctuated, but averaged less than 40 years, with no upward trend. Lifespan 
slowly but steadily increased in the second half of the nineteenth century and then jumped 
markedly in the twentieth century, initially in Europe and then in the rest of the world. Although 
there is still debate about the cause of these changes, demographers and economists increasingly 
attribute the modest declines in nineteenth century mortality rates to rising incomes. During the 
latter half of the twentieth century, global life expectancy increased by almost 20 years, from 
46.6 years in 1950–1955 to 66.5 years in 2005–2010 (UN 2005). This represents a global 
average increase in life expectancy of more than 4 months per year. Technical advancements 
appear to be the catalyst for this more recent, more dramatic decline.  
 
H
“Improvement in nutrition and health may account for as much as 30 per cent of the growth in 
conventionally measured per capita income between 1790–1980 in Western Europe.” Arora 
(2001) investigates the influence of health on the growth paths of 10 industrialized countries 
between the 1870s and the 1990s. Arora finds that changes in health increased the pace of 
income growth by 30 to 40 percent, altering permanently the slope of these countries’ income 
trajectories. The reported results hold for five different measures of long-term health and are 
largely unchanged when controlling for investment in physical capital. Fogel (1994) presents 
evidence of the historical impact of improved health on labor productivity. Using data from 
France circa 1790, he estimates that the bottom 10 per cent of the French labor force lacked the 
energy for regular work and the next 10 per cent only had enough energy for three hours per day 
of light work.  
 
E
health is a significant predictor of income growth. Economists have expended a great deal of 
effort determining why growth in some countries is faster than it is in others. Studies have 
identified many determinants of economic growth, e.g., initial level of income per capita, 
geographic location, institutional environment, economic policy, and investments in education. 
To this list, health has recently been added. A substantial body of evidence demonstrates that 
health, as measured by life expectancy or adult survival rates, has a significant effect on the pace 
of subsequent economic growth (e.g., Barro 1996, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; 
Bhargava et al. 2001, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2004; and Hamoudi and Sachs 1999). The 
work of Knowles and Owen (1997) is also consistent with the positive effect of health status on 
productivity. Taken together, these studies provide compelling evidence of a strong causal 
relationship from health to wealth. The effect is in addition to other influences on economic 
growth, emerges consistently across studies, and is strikingly large. Suppose we compare two 
countries that are identical save for a five-year difference in life expectancy. Several studies have 
shown that real income per capita in the healthier country will grow 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points 
per year faster than in its less healthy counterpart. This represents a sizeable boost to growth 
given that global per capita income grew by roughly 2 per cent per year from 1965 to 1990. 
Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2004) show that one extra year of life expectancy raises steady-
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To be complete, we must note that the case for the effect of health on economic well-being is 
ill a matter of dispute. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003) argue that 
en health and 
conomic performance. During the 1980s and 1990s, health sector budgets in developing 
s necessary for health improvements underlay the formulation 
nd enactment of many of these policies. However, in practice these measures have often proven 
ave gained greater 
urrency in recent years. In 2000, then-Director-General of the World Health Organization 
 
st
health differences are not large enough to account for much of the cross-country differences in 
incomes, and that the variation in political, economic, and social institutions is a more central 
factor. Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) go further, finding that "there is no evidence that the large 
exogenous increase in life expectancy led to a significant increase in per capita economic 
growth." For a detailed critique of their paper, see Bleakley (2006). In an effort to arrive at 
policy recommendations, Webber (2002) argues that life expectancy does not necessarily reflect 
investments in health. He uses nutrition, instead, as a proxy for health and finds that "reducing 
undernutrition would only make a modest contribution to economic growth . . . ." 
 
Practical experience provides some relevant evidence about the links betwe
e
countries were reduced as part of a package of austerity measures designed to promote economic 
growth (Périn and Attaran 2003: 1216). These austerity measures took the form of Structural 
Adjustment Programs and were adopted by many developing countries during the 1980s and 
1990s. Périn and Attaran (2004) describe the evolution and content of such programs as follows: 
“With the 1982 Mexico debt crisis, development became dominated by an obsession with 
macroeconomic fundamentals (tellingly, since the same donor countries were also the creditors 
whose unpaid loans were at risk)…The World Bank became the leading purveyor of structural 
adjustment…economic stability and development were best achieved through disciplined 
privatisation, deregulation, and trade liberalisation, often at the expense of social spending” 
(Périn and Attaran 2004: 1216). 
 
The belief that income growth i
a
unsuccessful. In Africa, for example, where many countries adopted austerity measures, life 
expectancy reversals occurred while the economy stagnated (McMichael et al. 2004: 1155). By 
contrast, in Southeast Asia, prioritization of investment in the health of populations contributed 
to the economic prosperity this region enjoyed (Bloom, Canning, and Malaney 2000: 257). The 
work of Easterly (1999) also weakens the argument for a focus on increasing incomes as a 
strategy for improving health. In an examination of outcomes over a reasonable period of time, 
Easterly finds only a weak effect of changes in income on population health. 
 
Views that acknowledge the economic value of health improvements h
c
(WHO), Gro Harlem Brundtland, established the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health 
(CMH). The commission’s mandate was to “assess the place of health in global economic 
development.” The CMH Report, released in 2001, underscores the importance of health as an 
instrument for economic development and poverty reduction. The Commission notes that modest 
investments in health could save 8 million lives per year, resulting in an estimated 330 million 
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) saved and about $200 billion in direct economic benefits 
per year by 2010 (CMH 2001: 12). The CMH report suggests that good health is not just a 
consequence but also a cause of economic development.  
  8Of course, the conventional view that wealthier implies healthier (i.e., the opposite causal 
relationship from that discussed above) is also true. These two views – that health promotes 
ealth and vice versa – are compatible. Causality running in each direction can give rise to 
or are more vulnerable to disease. Often, the 
oor suffer from ill health because they lack access to clean water and sanitation, live in the most 
undamental human right and a component of individual 
eedom in numerous national and international legal frameworks. For example, Article 25 of the 
uman capital and an essential investment in a productive society. Chakraborty (2003) expresses 
 
w
cumulative causality, a so-called virtuous circle in which health improvements promote 
economic growth, which in turn promotes health.  
 
The mutual reinforcement between health and income can also operate in reverse: sick people are 
more likely to become poor, and those who are po
p
environmentally fragile areas, and have difficulty getting medical care and information. Because 
many of the poor earn their livelihood by engaging in manual labor, health setbacks experienced 
by the breadwinner of a poor family may prove economically devastating. The household not 
only loses income, but may also be forced to sell off assets to pay for medical costs. Health 
problems can also plunge non-poor families into poverty; in countries that provide some level of 
safety net for the poor, downturns in health will increase the burden on the state while reducing 
state revenue. Increasingly, economists are recognizing that disease itself may thwart the 
economic growth that is presumed to prevent it. The vicious circle of poverty and disease is 
readily observable. Bloom and Canning (2001) describe the process of cumulative causality that 
can lead to the scenarios described here. An estimated eight million children under the age of 
five die each year from easily preventable and treatable conditions, almost exclusively within the 
developing world (WHO 2003). Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg (2005) focus on adult 
mortality and find that it is such a large factor in reducing economic growth that it "explains 
almost all of Africa's growth tragedy."  
 
The intrinsic value of health merits increased attention in economic analyses (see Marks and 
Mahal 2006). Health is enshrined as a f
fr
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care, and necessary social services and security in times of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control.” The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
Article 12, states: “The State Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” (Centre for the 
Study of Human Rights 2001). Kinney (2001) documents that 110 national constitutions 
reference a right to health care. Amartya Sen characterizes unnecessary morbidity and premature 
mortality as “unfreedoms” that constrain human capability (Sen 1999: 24). Both equity- and 
rights-based approaches to development strongly support devoting additional resources to health.  
 
To these perspectives we now add the macroeconomic argument: investing in population health 
can spur economic growth. We can therefore view health, along with education, as a form of 
h
this point quite succinctly: "When human capital drives economic growth, countries differing in 
health capital do not converge to similar living standards . . . ." 
 
  9Health and poverty 
 
A simple scatterplot shows the relationship between life expectancy and the poverty rate. Using 
e widely cited criterion of a $2/day (PPP-adjusted) poverty level, Figure 2.3 shows that 
life expectancy have lower poverty rates. The correlation is not 
xceptionally strong, but the overall pattern is clear and unsurprising. This chart does not in itself 
th
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Notes:  
Life expectancy data are for 2004. 
 data are for most recent year since 2000. 
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poverty, finding that the effect 
o  to the positive effect of health improvements on 
re e of the mechanisms by which this effect can occur 




Bloom et al (2006) report on the relationship between health and 
f improved health on economic growth extends
ducing poverty. They review and detail som
separate phenomena: the overall growth of income and changes in the dispersion of that income 
(which is a reflection of the extent to which the poor benefit from economic growth). Overall 
growth itself, in the absence of any change in the dispersion of income, will lower the number of 
people in poverty. Independently of this fact, a changing dispersion of income will change the 
  10number of people in poverty. If this distribution is in the direction of greater equality, the poverty 
rate will fall as those below the poverty line see their incomes rise. 
 
The authors examine three different health scenarios to investigate the possible effect of 
improved health (as proxied by improved life expectancy) on poverty reduction. (The three 
enarios are life expectancy, as estimated and predicted by the United Nations, and two 
 order to work, any diminution of their health can make them fall 
ven further into poverty; health shocks to a family or community can quickly reverse years of 
ith better health having the potential to 
duce poverty, there is a new rationale for greater spending on health. A new emphasis in this 
ier to wealthier: mechanisms  
here are several channels through which health may contribute to economic growth and poverty 
ve higher labor productivity because their workers are 
hysically and mentally more robust than those suffering from disease or disability. As detailed 
sc
scenarios with higher-than-observed-and-predicted life expectancy.) The simulations cover 31 
countries with a combined population of 3.1 billion in 1990. With a dollar-a-day poverty rate of 
30 per cent at that time, roughly 900 million people in those countries were living in poverty. 
The simulation results show that if life expectancy in 1990 had been 10 percent higher in 1990 
and had followed a path leading to its being 10 percent higher in 2015, then 30 million more 
people would have risen out of poverty than in the scenario that follows actual life expectancy 
data and current projections. This change is not as sizable as the effect of health on economic 
growth rates, but it is definitely not negligible. The authors point out that because the poor rely 
disproportionately on manual labor, it makes sense that they should benefit disproportionately 
from improvements in health.  
 
Broader arguments support the importance of the link between health and poverty. Since the 
poor rely on their good health in
e
improved health and income gains. Large and unanticipated healthcare costs can quickly 
appropriate a significant portion of a family's income and make it impossible for the family to 
maintain even the often-low standard of living it formerly experienced. By contrast, health 
improvements can offer the poor a chance to work more productively and to be able to pay for 
schooling, both of which offer a path out of poverty.   
 
Bloom and Canning (2003) point out that health improvements reduce poverty at the national 
level and also help families emerge from poverty. W
re







reduction. Healthier populations tend to ha
p
below, health improvements in a population change the age structure of society, offering a 
potentially substantial, albeit time-limited, boost to the productive capacity of an economy (on a 
per capita basis). Investment in physical and human capital, as well as research and development, 
is augmented as longer-lived individuals tend to increase their savings for retirement and foreign 
investment inflows tend to gravitate toward a healthy labor force. Improved health encourages 
stability in society and can increase the return to other forms of human capital, such as education 
and job experience. These mechanisms are explored in greater detail below.  
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Health to family welfare and labor and firm productivity 
 
Health has a direct effect on the productivity of the labor force. Case studies compiled by the 
ple living in poverty revealed that 
eir single greatest concern was the health of the household breadwinner. If he or she dies or 
mploy anthropometric measures and indexes of morbidity as measures of health 
uman capital. The results consistently indicate that health affects worker earnings and 
he larger economy. For firms, disease can have dire consequences for 
oth productivity and profitability, and thereby decrease competitiveness. The labor force in a 
ay shift from productive inputs toward health services or funeral 
osts. As a precautionary measure, some businesses in sub-Saharan Africa have reportedly 
World Bank that involved interviews with over 60,000 peo
th
requires expensive medical care, a family can be financially or economically crippled (World 
Bank and WHO 2002), possibly entering a vicious circle of poverty and disease from which it 
cannot escape.  
 
Studying the effects of health on households and individuals is the purview of microeconomics. 
Such analyses e
h
productivity. Many studies use adult stature as a proxy for long-term health. Although there is 
clearly a genetic component to height determination, bouts of infirmity throughout childhood 
arrest growth, leaving height as an indicator of the frequency and duration of childhood illness. 
Microeconomic analyses attempt to isolate the wage effects of height variations due to 
environmental health differences (see Schultz 1999). Using this method, Schultz and Tansel 
(1997) along with Ribero and Nunez (2000) demonstrate that one centimeter of additional height 
due to health inputs when young adds about 6 per cent to wages. Health interventions to 
overcome specific health problems can also boost labor productivity. Thomas et al. (2005) find 
improvements in the health and economic productivity of men who received treatment for iron 
deficiency; after treatment, they "are more likely to be working, sleep less, lose less work time to 
illness, are more energetic, more able to conduct physically arduous activities, and their psycho-
social health is better."  
 
In addition to the costs to individuals and households, disease has spillover effects that can 
impose a high cost on t
b
society with a high burden of disease experiences higher rates of turnover and absenteeism. 
Strategic management of the firm can be compromised if its managerial staff becomes ill. 
Although it has been argued that surplus labor makes sick workers easily replaceable, this case 
may be overstated. A study of the effect of HIV on nearly one thousand firms in sub-Saharan 
Africa found that replacing the skilled staff presented a serious problem (Biggs and Shah 1997). 
Death of a worker represents lost human capital investment in job training and worker 
experience. Worker morale may plummet as friends and co-workers fall sick and die, further 
diminishing firm productivity.  
 
Firm profitability generally suffers as health costs rise. When workers get sick, they claim more 
health benefits. Expenditures m
c
started training each skilled laborer in numerous jobs so that the company can more easily 
operate when skilled workers fall ill. Other firms are hiring multiple workers for each skilled 
position, to ensure trained replacements when incumbents die (Economist 2001). Disease may 
also affect the demand for a firm’s product. A declining consumer base translates into a small 
  12market for the firm’s products. In the aggregate and over time, these firm and household level 
effects could contribute to a slowdown in the national economy.  
 
 
Health to demography 
so affect demography, in ways that can possibly offer a boost to 
eveloping economies. There is a strong association between infant and child mortality and 
amilies tend to have fewer children. Low-cost interventions 





fertility. (In this chapter, "fertility" is used as demographers define it: the number of children a 
woman bears, rather than how likely or how easy it is for her to become pregnant and bear 
children.) Families in unhealthy societies tend to compensate for expected and actual child 
deaths by having more children. Although many other factors contribute to fertility, such as 
mother’s level of education, access to reproductive health services, and entrenched gender 
inequalities, the relationship between fertility and IMR is compelling. Countries with an IMR of 
less than 20 have an average total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.7. (A country's total fertility rate is 
defined as the average number of children women would bear if they follow the age-specific 
childbearing patterns that characterize a country at a particular time" (see Menken and Rahman 
2001: 83).) By contrast, the TFR is 6.3 for countries with an IMR over 100 (CMH 2001: 36). In 
many instances, high fertility rates reflect purposeful attempts by parents to achieve desired 
family size: having many children increases the likelihood that at least one or two will survive 
into adulthood. Bearing a high number of children taxes a mother’s health. Large family size also 
taxes household resources, which must be spread more thinly with less investment in the 
education of each child. High fertility (in a context of overall diminished mortality, and hence, 
rising population) increases the dependency ratio, i.e., the ratio of the dependent population 
(those aged 0–14 and aged 65 plus) to the working-age population (aged 15–64). A high 
dependency ratio resulting from high fertility means that a larger proportion of earnings are 
channeled into supporting children.  
 
When childhood survival rates rise, f
su
breastfeeding have ushered in dramatic reductions in infant and child mortality over the past four 
decades. Globally, child mortality has declined from 192 per 1000 live births in 1960 to 79 per 
1000 live births in 2004 (World Bank 2006). The reduction in child mortality has been 
particularly dramatic in South-East Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Latin America regions 
(WHO 2003: 9). As noted above, when infant and child mortality fall and survival to adulthood 
becomes more likely, parents can feel more confident having fewer children. The combination of 
an initial drop in the infant mortality rate (resulting in there being more children) and the 
subsequent fall in fertility (leading eventually to smaller age cohorts) creates a "bulge" 
generation that moves through the age structure of the population. This bulge is the inevitable 
result of the "demographic transition" (i.e., the move toward lower mortality, followed by a 
move toward lower fertility). When the bulge generation represents a large number of working-
age people, their contribution to the economy can cause income per capita to rise dramatically. 
This effect is called the demographic dividend and its realization is heavily reliant on policies 
that allow extra workers to be absorbed into the workforce (Bloom and Canning 2001: 187; 
Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2004; Lee and Mason, 2006). 
  13East Asia provides a compelling example of how improvements in public health contribute to 
economic growth via demographic change. A growing body of evidence suggests that the East 
sian countries that sustained high rates of economic growth in the second half of the twentieth 
nother key element in East Asia’s economic success was the region’s high rate of capital 
inarily high savings rate of around 30 per cent of income. 
here are two channels, one accounting and one behavioral, through which the health of East 
 or fall of the share of the population at the high-savings ages – this is the 
ffect considered by the accounting channel. In the case of East Asia, the demographic dividend 
A
century did so thanks to high rates of growth of labor and capital. Growth in labor supply largely 
resulted from changes in the age structure of the population that followed from improved 
sanitation, safer water, and the development of antibiotics and the anti-malarial insecticide DDT. 
Life expectancy increased from 39 years in 1960 to 67 years in 1990. Infant mortality also 
declined, from 175 per 1,000 in 1950 to 52 per 1,000 in 1995 (Asian Development Bank 1997), 
followed by a precipitous drop in fertility. A greater number of surviving children, followed by 
smaller birth cohorts, created relatively large “baby boom” cohorts in a number of countries. 
When these cohorts reached working age, the dependency ratio was dramatically lower than in 
the past. The working-age population share rose from about 55 per cent of East Asia’s total 
population in 1965 to 70 per cent in 2001. A beneficial policy environment, which focused on 
education and selective openness to trade, allowed this “boom” generation to be integrated into 
the economy. East Asia reaped the productivity benefits of the swollen workforce. Between 1965 
and 1990 per capita income rose by over 6 per cent per year. This phenomenal growth was given 
the name the East Asian “miracle” (World Bank 1993b). However, Bloom and Williamson 
(1998) and Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2000) demonstrate that no less than a third of the 
“miracle” could be explained by the demographic dividend.  
 
 
Health to savings and investment 
 
A
accumulation, driven by an extraord
T
Asia’s population contributed to this high level of savings. Common to both channels is the well-
established life-cycle theory for how consumption and savings decisions are made at the 
household level (see Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). According to this model, households earn 
an income stream over their lifetime and must choose a consumption path consistent with these 
earnings. It is assumed that, in general, people save when they are young to finance their 
retirement. Peak savings typically occur between the ages of 40 and 65. Absent a bequest motive, 
the dissaving of the old should offset the saving of the young in a stationary population (i.e., a 
population with a stable age distribution and no population growth). In this situation, there are no 
aggregate savings.  
 
If the age structure of the population is unstable, aggregate savings or dissavings may occur 
according to the rise
e
resulted in a large fraction of its population being in the peak savings range of 40–65 years of 
age. Furthermore, this was the first cohort in the region to be living in a low-mortality 
environment and to be saving for retirement on a large scale (Bloom, Canning and Jamison 2004: 
12). Age structure effects appear to account for perhaps one-fourth of East Asia’s savings boom 
(Bloom, Canning, and Graham 2003).   
 
  14The behavioral channel highlights the fact that improvements in health and longevity likely 
affect life-cycle behavior as individuals look forward to longer, healthier lives (see Bloom, 
anning, Mansfield, and Moore, forthcoming 2007). Increases in longevity tend to increase the 
ealth, foreign investors and executives 
nd to shun areas where disease is rampant and where access to health care is limited. By 
nother mechanism by which health affects income is through its relationship to education. 
e and longstanding literature demonstrating that education increases 
roductivity and wages. A typical estimate is that a year of education increases wages by about 
e better-educated, higher-earning adults. Bleakley (2003) finds that deworming of 
hildren in the American South had an effect on their educational achievements while in school. 
Miguel and Kremer (2004) find that deworming of children in Kenya increased school 
C
relative length of retirement, thereby raising the need for retirement income and generating 
higher savings rates among the young. Bloom, Canning, and Graham (2003) model and 
empirically investigate the effect of increasing longevity on the national savings rate. They report 
that a 10-year rise in life expectancy is associated with about a 4-percentage point rise in the 
savings rate. Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000) argue that rising life expectancy can account for the 
boom in savings in Taiwan since the 1960s. Rising longevity in developing countries could 
therefore magnify the current generation’s incentive to save – a development that may have 
sizable effects on domestic investment. Although this saving and investment boom may only last 
for one generation and is offset by the needs of the elderly once the population ages, it can 
substantially boost economic growth rates while it lasts.  
 
Health also affects foreign direct investment (FDI). A high burden of disease enervates the labor 
force. Perhaps also for fear of endangering their own h
te
contrast, a healthy, productive workforce will tend to attract FDI inflows. Research has 
demonstrated that life expectancy exerts an independent influence on FDI: every additional year 
of life expectancy contributes to about a 9 per cent increase in gross FDI inflows in low- and 
middle- income countries (Alsan, Bloom, and Canning 2004: 11). These empirical results are 
supported by historical evidence. The textbook instance of disease interference in investment is 
that of the building of the Panama Canal. Yellow fever and communicable diseases claimed the 
lives of 10,000 to 20,000 workers between 1882 and 1888, forcing Ferdinand de Lesseps and the 
French to abandon the construction project (Jones 1990).  
  
 
Health to education 
 
A
There is an extensiv
p
10 per cent (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004). Healthier households generally have more 
income for many of the reasons discussed above. Their enhanced productivity allows them to 
earn higher wages, they have fewer health-related expenses, and they are able to attain desired 
family size at lower fertility rates. Healthy families can therefore afford to spend more on their 
children's education. Given the importance of education to income, it is significant that health 
can serve as a complementary input to education. In this regard, Finlay (2006) makes a 
significant finding: that the effect of health on economic growth is stronger in countries where 
education is weak, because a population that relies more on unskilled labor is more dependent on 
good health. 
 
Healthier children have enhanced cognitive function and higher school attendance, allowing 
them to becom
c
  15attendance (though it did not enhance academic performance). In a study in India, Bobonis, 
Miguel, and Puri-Sharma (forthcoming 2006) find that deworming and treating anemia promoted 
school attendance. 
 
Increased longevity can make investing in education more attractive because it affords a longer 
time horizon over which to reap the benefits of more schooling (Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil 
2000). Bils and Klenow (2000) find an effect of life expectancy on investments in education at 
e national level. In addition, lower infant mortality may encourage parents to invest more 
n who are unprepared to attend 
hool, the failure of many students to learn in school, and the unequal participation of girls in 
 million infants are born each year in developing countries with impaired growth 
ue to poor nutrition during fetal life (UN 2000). For example, cretinism, which can be avoided 
. (Estimates of mortality 
ay be inadequate in assessing the burden of disease among school children because most 
attainment. Attending to remediable medical problems could help keep girls in school. 
th
resources in fewer children, leading to low fertility but high levels of human capital investment 
(including in education) in each child (Kalemli-Ozcan 2002).  
 
There are numerous paths from impaired health to the inadequate education of children. Leslie 
and Jamison (1990) review the links between health conditions and what they see as the three 




Children’s readiness for school may be hindered by cognitive and physical impairments. These 
problems may begin in utero due to inadequate nutrition and poor health of the mother. An 
estimated 30
d
if iodized salt is provided to the mother, is the most common preventable cause of mental 
retardation worldwide (Cao et al. 1994: 1739). Moreover, malnourished children are less likely 
to enroll in school; those who do enroll do so at a later age (UN 2004).  
 
The failure of children in developing countries to learn in school is often attributable to illness. 
The most important causes of morbidity among school-age children include helminthic 
infections, micronutrient deficiencies, and chronic protein malnutrition
m
illnesses are non-fatal.) When not fatal, these conditions impair children’s ability to learn by 
directly contributing to disease, absenteeism, and inattention among children. Micronutrient 
deficiencies have a variety of adverse health effects. Vitamin A deficiency contributes to measles 
mortality and diarrheal illness (WHO 2004a) and is the leading cause of preventable pediatric 
blindness in low-income countries (Sommer and West 1996: 649ff). Impaired vision is a huge 
barrier to receiving an education, particularly in resource-poor settings. Globally, 4.4 million 
children and 6.2 million women of childbearing age manifest varying degrees of vision 
impairment from vitamin A deficiency (UN 2004). Iron deficiency is a well-documented cause 
of impaired cognitive development and lowered school achievement, and has a high economic 
cost (Grantham-McGregor and Ani 2001). It is also one of the most prevalent nutrient 
deficiencies in the world, affecting an estimated two billion people (WHO 2004a). Horton and 
Ross (2003) estimate that income forgone due to iron deficiency ranges from 2 per cent of GDP 
in Honduras to 7.9 per cent in Bangladesh. The higher estimates are associated with severe iron 
deficiency and higher returns to educational attainment in the labor market for a given country. 
 
Biological and cultural forces affect the health of girls and can impede their educational 
  16Menstruation exacerbates iron-deficiency anemia and at around the same developmental stage, 
iodine deficiency disorders also begin to affect more girls. Pregnancy increases nutrient demands 
nd the risk of morbidity and mortality from a multitude of associated causes. An estimated 15 
S-affected households was removed from school because school fees could not be paid 
r the child was required to work (Topouzis 1994). The generation of orphans HIV is creating 
the role that HIV/AIDS can play in economic outcomes via its 
etrimental effect on educational attainment; much more broadly, the epidemic provides an 
teresting perspective on the standard economic view of the relationship between health and 
nd development" in countries with severe epidemics. However, a number of other 
nalyses conclude that HIV/AIDS has had no measurable effect on income per capita (Bloom 
a
per cent of women develop potentially life-threatening complications associated with pregnancy, 
such as hemorrhage, infection, unsafe abortion, eclampsia, and obstructed labor (WHO 2004b). 
Early marriage and child-bearing may account for the drop-off in number of girls enrolled in 
secondary and tertiary school. A ubiquitous and disturbing pattern is that when illness strikes a 
family, girls often discontinue studies to assume responsibilities for household chores. 
Overviews of the interaction between health and education appear in Bloom (2005) and Bloom 
(2006).   
 
The AIDS epidemic demonstrates particularly starkly the interplay between disease and 
education. Educational opportunities erode as families are forced to pay more for medical and 
burial costs. A study in rural districts in Uganda found that one in five children living in 
HIV/AID
o
(14 million, mostly in Africa) strains household resources and affects educational attainment 
(WHO 2004c). Orphans have lower school enrollment rates and live in more impoverished 
households. Families who receive orphans often cannot afford to send all children in the 
household to school and must decide which children to enroll. Boys are usually chosen over girls 
and biological children are selected over orphans (Ableidinger, Case, and Paxson 2002). (The 
study finds that school enrollment rates reflect the degree of kinship between the child and the 
head of the household.) HIV/AIDS also affects the supply of education, damaging both its 
quantity and quality. A sharp increase in mortality rates among teachers and administrators 
accounts for this setback. 12 per cent of teachers in South Africa, 19 per cent of teachers in 
Zambia, and more than 30 per cent of teachers in Botswana are infected with HIV (BBC 2002). 
In Zambia, the number of teachers killed by AIDS in 1998 was equivalent to two-thirds of the 
number of teachers trained in the same year (WHO 2004c). Even where teachers are present, 
they may be sick and ineffective. 
 
 
HIV/AIDS as a window into the relationship between health and economic outcomes 
 





The argument that population health is an important determinant of income growth implies that 
countries with waning health due to high rates of HIV/AIDS have poor economic prospects. For 
example, Haacker (2004) argues that HIV/AIDS "is the most serious impediment to economic 
growth a
a
and Mahal 1997a; Mahal 2004; Werker, Ahuja, and Wendell 2006). Still others, such as Young 
(2005), suggest that, despite the obvious human cost, HIV/AIDS might actually promote growth 
of income per capita. According to this last argument, the reduction in the labor force resulting 
  17from AIDS may increase worker productivity because surviving workers have more land and 
capital at their disposal, and because the capital/labor balance is pushed in a direction that 
benefits workers. Thus, the heightened mortality from disease may boost living standards. (The 
origins of this view can be traced to Thomas Malthus (1798), who believed epidemics and 
famines were “natural checks” on unfettered population growth. This bleak outlook led 
economics to be labeled “the dismal science.”)  
 
The description of events provided by Young may accurately describe the mortality “shocks” 
that characterized epidemics throughout history. (See Bloom and Mahal 1997b for detail on 
AIDS, influenza, and the Black Death). Yet the short-lived epidemics of the past, such as 
epidemic cholera or the 1918 Spanish flu, bear little resemblance to the current epidemic of 
IV/AIDS. The AIDS virus kills, but does so slowly. Because it is most frequently transmitted 
ases negatively impacts economies and is associated with lower 
conomic growth rates. Gallup and Sachs (2001) demonstrate that countries heavily burdened 
 a statistical life” (VSL) literature. This literature places a 
ollar value on human life using information from individuals’ choices to take life-threatening 
990–2000, which 
 a far higher number than earlier estimates for the effect of AIDS on GDP over the same period 
H
via sexual activity, it preferentially infects young and middle-age adults. As a result, HIV/AIDS 
affects societies in different ways than other epidemics and leads to higher burdens of youth 
(orphan) and elderly dependency. Because the possibility of contracting HIV reduces the 
incentives and opportunities for education and savings, it likely magnifies the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty.  
 
It is estimated that approximately 39 million people are infected with HIV (UNAIDS 2006), and 
that AIDS is now the world’s leading killer of adults ages 15–59 (WHO 2003). Co-infections of 
HIV and malaria or tuberculosis can exacerbate an already dire health situation. A high 
prevalence of some dise
e
with malaria experienced an average growth rate in per capita GDP of about 0.4 per cent per year 
between 1965 and 1990, in comparison with an average growth rate of 2.3 per cent in other 
countries. Moreover, a consideration of GDP per capita alone does not fully express the 
economic losses; it refers to the effects of disease on the income of survivors, but does not reflect 
the monetary value of the loss of life.  
 
Because GDP per capita is not a complete measure of well-being, a “full income” indicator can 
be used to convey a more accurate picture of the economic effect of AIDS. Full income consists 
of two components: GDP per capita for survivors and the estimated value of life for decedents. 
The latter is derived from the “value of
d
risks, no matter how small. This method has drawbacks, but it enables governments to compare 
public health and other development interventions that reduce mortality risks.  
 
Estimates of the monetary value of life are often very large (Viscusi and Aldy 2003). A typical 
range for a country’s VSL is around 100–200 times GDP per capita, with richer countries located 
at the higher end of the range. Using full income, a conservative estimate of the cost of Africa’s 
mortality change due to AIDS is 1.7 per cent of Africa's income per year from 1
is
(Bloom, Canning and Jamison 2004: 14). More broadly, using techniques that do not rely solely 
on GDP per capita as the outcome of interest, studies of many countries have shown the intrinsic 
value of health gains to have been comparable to or higher than the value of income gains due to 
health improvements (Nordhaus 2003; Becker, Philipson and Soares 2005). 
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The way forward 
 
This chapter summarizes the evidence on the contribution of population health to economic 
rowth and poverty reduction and the mechanisms through which this takes place.  
is to determine what fraction of societal resources should be allocated to the 
ealth sector. We do not attempt to provide an answer to that question, but the CMH Report 
lation health 
mong low- and middle-income countries would approach $57 billion by 2007 and $94 billion 
w- and middle-income countries could also do much more to improve the 
ansparency, accountability, and equity of national health systems. Health is proving to be a 
s 
een returned to the United States every 26 days (CISET 1994). 
g
 
The next logical step 
h
makes explicit recommendations regarding domestic and international financial contributions 
towards health. The Report estimates that total health outlays for improving popu
a
by 2015. The low- and middle-income countries could commit an additional $35 billion per year 
by 2007 and $63 billion by 2015. In addition, the Report calls for concessional grants totaling 
$22 billion by 2007 and $31 billion by 2015 from wealthy countries and international 
development banks. The recommended rise in donor funding for health represents 0.1 per cent of 
donor country GDP.  
 
In any case, it is clear that where disease is most rampant, among poor populations within and 
across countries, the resources necessary to improve health are most scarce. Wealthy countries 
could contribute more financial resources toward reducing the burden of disease in the 
developing world. Lo
tr
worthwhile investment. Improved health will allow developing countries to enjoy higher rates of 
economic growth and faster poverty reduction; wealthy nations will benefit from reduced 
expenditures on global public health threats, expanding markets, and enhanced global security. 
 
If history serves as a harbinger of things to come, the financial rewards of global health 
investments are reaped many times over. Smallpox eradication obviates the need for preventive 
measures and treatment facilities. The cost to the United States for the successful 13-year 
campaign was about $30 million; since smallpox was eradicated in 1977, the total investment ha
b
 
In sum, investments in population health can be considered integral to economic development 
and to promoting the wealth of nations.  Improving the health of nations is a powerful instrument 
to this end. 
 
  19References 
 
Ableidinger, J., A. Case, and C. Paxson (2002). “Orphans in Africa.” NBER Working Paper 
9213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson (2006). "Disease and Development: The Effect of Life 
Expectancy on Economic Growth." NBER Working Paper 12269. Available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12269. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson (2003). "Disease and Development in 
Historical Perspective." Journal of the European Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings, 
April, 1 (2-3): 397–405. 
 
Alsan, M., D.E. Bloom, and D. Canning (2004). “The Effect of Population Health on Foreign 
Direct Investment,” NBER Working Paper 10596. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, MA. 
  
Arora, S. (2001). “Health, Human Productivity and Long-term Growth.” Journal of Economic 
History 61 (3): 699–749. 
 
Asian Development Bank. (1997). Emerging Asia, Changes and Challenges. Manila: Asian 
Development Bank. 
 
Barro, R. (1996). “Health and Economic Growth.” Mimeo, Harvard University. 
 
Barro, R. (1997). “Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-country Empirical Study.” 
Lionel Robbins Lectures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Barro, R. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995). Economic Growth. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Becker, G.S., T.J. Philipson, and R.R. Soares (2005). “The Quantity of Life and the Evolution of 
World Inequality.” American Economic Review 95: 277–91.   
  
Bhargava, A., D. Jamison, L. Lau, and C. Murray (2001). “Modeling the Effects of Health on 
Economic Growth.” Journal of Health Economics 20: 423–440. 
 
Biggs, T., and M. Shah (1997). “The Impact of the AIDS Epidemic on African Firms.” RPED 
Discussion Paper No. 72. World Bank, Washington, DC. 
 
Bils, M., and P.J. Klenow (2000). "Does Schooling Cause Growth?" American Economic Review 
90: 1160–83. 
 
Bleakley, H. (2003). “Disease and Development, Evidence from the American South.” Journal 
of the European Economic Association 1: 376–86.  
 
  20Bleakley, Hoyt (2006). "Disease and Development: Comments on Acemolgu and Johnson." 
Remarks delivered at the NBER Summer Institute on Economic Fluctuations and Growth, July 
16. Available at 
http://home.uchicago.edu/~bleakley/Bleakley_Comments_Acemoglu_Johnson.pdf. 
 
Bloom, David E. (2005). “Education and Public Health: Mutual Challenges Worldwide: Guest 
Editor's Overview.” Comparative Education Review, November, 49 (4): 437–451. 
 
Bloom, David E. (2006). “Education, Health, and Development.” In Joel E. Cohen, David E. 
Bloom, and Martin Malin, eds., Universal Basic and Secondary Education: What, Why, and 
How, Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming. 
 
Bloom, D.E., and D. Canning (2001). “Demographic Change and Economic Growth: The Role 
of Cumulative Causality.” In N. Birdsall, A.C. Kelley, and S. Sinding, eds., Population Does 
Matter: Demography, Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bloom, David E., and David Canning (2003). "The Health and Poverty of Nations: From Theory 
to Practice." Journal of Human Development, March, Vol. 4, No. 1, 47-71. 
 
Bloom, David E., and David Canning (forthcoming 2007). "The Preston Curve 30 years on: still 
sparking fires." International Journal of Epidemiology. 
 
Bloom D.E., D. Canning, and B. Graham. (2003). “Longevity and Life-cycle Savings.” 
Scandinavian. Journal of Economics 105 (3): 319–338. 
 
Bloom, D.E., D. Canning, and D. Jamison (2004). “Health, wealth and welfare.” Finance and 
Development 41 (1): 10–15. 
 
Bloom, D.E., D. Canning, and P. Malaney (2000).“Demographic Change and Economic Growth 
in Asia.” Supplement to Population and Development Review 26: 257–90. 
 
Bloom David E., David Canning, Bryan Graham, and Jaypee Sevilla (2006). "Improving health: 
A key to halving global poverty by 2015," In Agosín, Manuel R., David E. Bloom, Georges 
Chapelier, and Jagdish Saigal, eds., Solving the Riddle of Globalization and Development. UK: 
Routledge. 
 
Bloom, David, E., David Canning, Rick Mansfield, and Michael Moore (forthcoming 2007).  
“Demographic Change, Savings, and International Capital Flows: Theory and Evidence.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics. 
 
Bloom, D.E., D. Canning, and J. Sevilla (2004). "The effect of health on economic growth: A 
production function approach", World Development 32 (1): 1–13. 
 
Bloom, D.E. and A.S. Mahal (1997a). “Does the AIDS Epidemic Threaten Economic Growth?” 
Journal of Econometrics 77 (1): 105–24.  
  21 
Bloom, David E., and Ajay Mahal (1997b). "AIDS, Flu, and the Black Death: Impacts on 
Economic Growth and Well-being." Pp. 22–52 in David Bloom and Peter Godwin, eds., The 
Economics of HIV and AIDS: The Case of South and South East Asia, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Bloom, David E., and Jeffrey G. Williamson (1998). “Demographic Transitions and Economic 
Miracles in Emerging Asia.” World Bank Economic Review 12 (3): 419–55. 
Bobonis, Gustavo J., Edward Miguel, and Charu Puri-Sharma (forthcoming 2006). "Anemia and 
School Participation." Journal of Human Resources. 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2002). “Aids Ravages Ranks of Teachers.” 8 May. 
Cao, X.Y., X.M. Jiang, Z.H. Dou, M.A. Rakeman, M.L. Zhang, K. O’Donnell, T. Ma, K. 
Amette, N. DeLong, and G.R. Delong (1994). “Timing and vulnerability of the Brain to Iodine 
Deficiency in endemic cretinism.” New England Journal of Medicine 331: 1739–1741. 
Center for the Study of Human Rights (2001). 25+ Human Rights Documents. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
 
Chakraborty, S. (2004). "Endogenous lifetime and economic growth." Journal of Economic 
Theory, 116:119–137. 
 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) (2001). Macroeconomics and Health: 
Investing in Health for Economic Development. Geneva: World Health Organization. 
 
Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology Policy (CISET) (2006). 
Global Microbial Threats in the 1990s. Available at 
http://clinton1.nara.gov/White_House/EOP/OSTP/CISET/html/iintro.html (accessed 14 
September 2006). 
 
Cutler, D.M., A.S. Deaton, A. Lleras-Muney (2006). “The Determinants of Mortality.” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 20 (3): 71–96. 
 
de la Croix, D., and O. Licandro (1999). "Life expectancy and endogenous growth." Economic 
Letters, 65:255–263. 
 
Easterlin, R. (1999). "How beneficent is the market?  A look at the modern history of mortality." 
European Review of Economic History 3 (3): 257–294. 
 
Easterly, W. (1999). "Life During Growth." Journal of Economic Growth 4: 239–76. 
 
Economist (2001). “The worst way to lose talent.” The Economist, 8
 February. 
 
Finlay, Jocelyn (2006). "The Role of Health in Economic Development." Mimeo. Harvard 
University Program on the Global Demography of Aging.  
 
  22Fogel, R.W. (1990). “The Conquest of High Mortality and Hunger in Europe and America: 
Timing and Mechanisms.” NBER Working Paper No. 16. National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Fogel, R.W. (1994). “Economic Growth, Population Theory and Physiology: The Bearing of 
Long Term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy.” American Economic Review 12 (3):  
363–395. 
 
Gallup, J.L., and J.D. Sachs (2001). “The economic burden of malaria.” American Journal of 
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene 64 (1, 2 Supplement): 85–96. 
 
Grantham-McGregor, S., and C. Ani (2001). “A review of studies on the effect of iron deficiency 
on cognitive development in children.” The Journal of Nutrition 131 (2S-2): 649S–666S. 
 
Haacker, M. (2004). “HIV/AIDS: The Impact on the Social Fabric and the Economy.” In M. 
Haacker, ed., The Macroeconomics of HIV/AIDS, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
 
Hamoudi, A., and J. Sachs (1999). “Economic Consequences of Health Status: A Review of the 
Evidence.” Harvard Center for International Development, Working Paper No. 30.  
 
Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten (2006). Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center 
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, September. 
 
Horton, S., and J. Ross (2003). “The economics of iron deficiency.” Journal of Food Policy 28 
(1): 51–75. 
 
Jones, T. (1990). The Panama Canal: A brief history. Available at 
http://www.ilovelanguages.com/Tyler/nonfiction/pan2.html (accessed 23 September 2006).  
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S. (2002). "Does Mortality Decline Promote Economic Growth?" Journal of 
Economic Growth 7: 411–39. 
 
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., H.E. Ryder, and D.N. Weil (2000). "Mortality decline, human capital 
investment, and economic growth." Journal of Development Economics 62: 1–23.  
 
Kinney, E.D. (2001). “The international human right to health: What does this mean for our 
Nation and our World?” Indiana Law Review 34: 1457–1475. 
 
Knowles, S., and P.D. Owen (1997). "Education and health in an effective-labour empirical 
growth model." Economic Record, 73(223). 
 
Lee, R., and D. Mason (2006). “What is the Demographic Dividend?” Finance and 
Development, September: 16–17. 
 
  23Lee, R., A. Mason, and T. Miller (2000). "Life Cycle Saving and the Demographic Transition: 
The Case of Taiwan." Population and Development Review 26 (Supplement): 194–219. 
 
Leslie, J., and D. Jamison (1990). "Health and Nutrition Considerations in Educational Planning: 
The Cost and Effectiveness of School-Based Interventions." Food and Nutrition Bulletin 12: 
204–215. 
 
Lorentzen, P., McMillan, J., and Wacziarg, R. (2005). "Death and development." NBER 
Working Paper 11620. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11620. 
 
McMichael, Anthony, et al. (2004). “Mortality trends and setbacks: global convergence or 
divergence?” The Lancet 363: 1155–1159. 
 
Mahal, Ajay (2004). "Economic Implications of Inertia on HIV/AIDS and Benefits of Action," 
Economic and Political Weekly (March 6), 1049–1063. 
 
Malthus T.R. (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population. London: W. Pickering., 1986. 
 
Marks, Stephen, and Ajay S. Mahal (2006). “Strategies for Promoting Children’s Rights and 
Poverty Reduction: Economic and Human Rights Perspectives”, Harvard School of Public 
Health, mimeo. 
 
Menken, J., and O.R. Rahman. (2001). “Chapter 3: Reproductive Health.” In M. Merson, R. 
Black, and A. Mills, eds., International Public Health: Diseases Programs, Systems and 
Policies, Gaithersburg, MD: Aspen Publishers. 
 
Miguel, E., and M. Kremer (2004). “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the 
Presence of Treatment Externalities.” Econometrica 72: 159–217. 
 
Modigliani, F., and R. Brumberg (1954). "Utility analysis and the consumption function: An 
interpretation of cross-section data." In K.K. Kurihara, ed., Post-Keynesian Economics, New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.   
 
Murray, C., and A. Lopez (1996). The Global Burden of Disease. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Navarro, V. (2004). “The World Situation and The WHO.” The Lancet 363 (9417): 1321–1323. 
 
Nordhaus, W. (2003). "The Health of Nations: The Contribution of Improved Health to Living 
Standards." Pp. 9-40 in K.H. Murphy and R.H. Topel, eds., Measuring the Gains from Medical 
Research: An Economic Approach, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Périn I., and A. Attaran (2003). “Trading ideology for dialogue: an opportunity to fix 
international aid for health?” Lancet 361: 1216–19. 
 
  24Preston, S. (1975). “The Changing Relation between Mortality and Level of Economic 
Development.” Population Studies 29 (2): 231–248. 
 
Pritchett, L., and L. Summers (1996). “Wealthier is Healthier.” The Journal of Human Resources 
31(4): 841–868. 
  
Psacharopoulos, George, and Harry Anthony Patrinos (2004). “Returns to investment in 
education: a further update.” Education Economics 12 (2) (August): 111–134.  
 
Ribero, R., and J. Nunez (2000). “Adult Morbidity, Height and Earnings in Columbia.” In W.D. 
Savedoff and T.P. Schultz, eds., Wealth from Health, Washington, D.C.: Inter-American 
Development Bank.  
 
Schultz, P. (1999). “Productive Benefits of Improving Health: Evidence from Low-Income 
Countries.” Mimeo, Yale University. 
 
Schultz, T. P., and A. Tansel (1997). “Wage and labor supply effects of illness in Côte d’Ivoire 
and Ghana: Instrumental variable estimates for days disabled.” Journal of Development 
Economics 53 (2): 251–86. 
 
Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Shastry, G.K., and D.N. Weil (2002). “How much of cross-country income variation is explained 
by health?” Journal of the European Economic Association 1 (2–3): 387–96. 
 
Sommer, A., and K.P. West, Jr. (1996). Vitamin A Deficiency: Health, Survival and Nutrition. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Thomas, Duncan, Elizabeth Frankenberg, Jed Friedman, Jean-Pierre Habicht, Mohammed 
Hakimi, Nicholas Ingwersen, Jaswadi, Nathan Jones, Christopher McKelvey, Gretel Pelto, 
Bondan Sikoki, Teresa Seeman, James P. Smith, Cecep Sumantri, Wayan Suriastini, and 
Siswanto Wilopo (2005). "Causal effect of health on labor market outcomes: Experimental 
evidence." http://www.econ.duke.edu/~taroz/Iron_Indonesia05.pdf. 
 
Topouzis, D. (1994) “Uganda: The socio-economic impact of HIV/AIDS on rural families with 
an emphasis on youth.” Rome, FAO (TCP/UGA/2256). Available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/t2942e/t2942e00.htm (accessed14 September 2006). 
 
UNAIDS (2006). 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic. Geneva: UNAIDS. 
 
United Nations (2000). 4th Report on the World Nutrition Situation: Nutrition Throughout the 
Life Cycle. Available at 
http://www.unsystem.org/scn/Publications/4RWNS/4rwns.pdf
(accessed 14 September 2006). 
 
  25United Nations (2004). 5th Report on the World Nutrition Situation: Nutrition for improved 
development outcomes. Available at 
http://www.unsystem.org/scn/Publications/AnnualMeeting/SCN31/SCN5Report.pdf 
 (accessed 14 September 2006). 
 
United Nations (2005). World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. New York: United 
Nations. 
 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2003). Human Development Report 2003: 
Millennium Development Goals: A compact among nations to end human poverty. New York: 
UNDP. 
 
Viscusi, W.K., and J.E. Aldy (2003). "The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of 
Market Estimates from Around the World." The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27: 5–76. 
 
Webber, D. J. (2002). "Polices to stimulate growth: Should we invest in health or education?" 
Applied Economics, 34:1633–1643. 
 
Werker, Eric, Amrita Ahuja, and Brian Wendell (2006). "Male Circumcision and HIV/AIDS: 
The Macroeconomic Impact of a Health Crisis." August. Manuscript.  
 
World Bank (2006). World Development Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
World Bank (1993a). World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health. Washington DC: 
World Bank. 
 
World Bank (1993b). The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
World Bank and World Health Organization (2002). Dying for Change. Available at 
www1.worldbank.org/prem/poverty/voices/reports/dying/index.htm (accessed 14 September 
2006). 
 
World Health Organization (2003). World Health Report 2003: Shaping the Future. Geneva: 
World Health Organization. 
 
World Health Organization (2004a). Nutrition for Health and Development. Available at 
http://www.who.int/nut/ (accessed 16 September 2006). 
 
World Health Organization (2004b). Making Pregnancy Safer. Fact sheet No. 276. Geneva: 
World Health Organization. Available at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs276/en/. 
 
World Health Organization (2004c). World Health Report 2004: Changing History. Geneva: 
World Health Organization. 
 
  26Young A. (2005). “The Gift of the Dying: The Tragedy of AIDS and the Welfare of Future 
African Generations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 243–266.  
 
  27